Why Southeast Asian nations are hesitant to join major US-Philippine Balikatan drills

Balikatan remains Manila-Washington’s flagship exercise, but ASEAN members have stayed on the sidelines as the drills expand in scale and reach. Analysts frame the hesitation as a signal of balancing choices in a shifting regional security order. The drills test US commitment and regional perceptions of Beijing’s growing influence.

The Southeast Asian stance on Balikatan highlights a quiet but consequential shift in regional security dynamics. Large-scale drills that increasingly invite multiple partners continue to unsettle some ASEAN capitals, who fear being drawn into a great-power contest. The hesitation to participate reflects a deliberate calculus about sensitivity to sovereignty, domestic politics, and long-term security alignments. Manila and Washington press ahead, arguing that the exercises deter regional threats while building interoperability with partners.

For many ASEAN states, joining Balikatan would signify clear alignment with Washington amid rising strategic competition with Beijing. Some governments see value in the reassurance of US commitment and technical benefits from multinational exercises. Others worry that participation could be portrayed as taking sides in a struggle between the two Asian giants. The result is a pragmatic, if cautious, approach to Balikatan’s evolving role in regional deterrence and crisis management.

Strategically, the decision to stay out or participate is less about the drills themselves and more about regional power balance. ASEAN members are weighing the benefits of access to advanced training and intelligence-sharing against potential implications for regional autonomy. The balance of power in the South China Sea, as well as broader Indo-Pacific rivalries, frames every participation decision. The broader trend is a move toward diversified security partnerships rather than a single-block alignment.

Operationally, Balikatan has grown to include more partners, greater complexity, and expanded logistics footprints. The drills test amphibious capacity, air-defense coordination, and cyber resilience in a multinational setting. Budget allocations and force postures in participating countries influence the scale and cadence of joint exercises. The evolving program reflects both the US pivot and ASEAN states’ insistence on capable, credible defense ties without revealing strategic calculations.

The consequences are likely to be twofold: Balikatan’s potency as a deterrent signal will depend on participation breadth, while ASEAN states will continue to hedge their bets. If more partners join, the exercise could crystallize a regional security architecture with shared norms and interoperability. If participation remains limited, Balikatan may become a symbol of selective engagement rather than a universal stabilizing mechanism. In either case, the balance between deterrence and autonomy will shape regional security choices for years to come.